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CASE NOTES
PEOPLE v. DOLLEN AND UNITED STATES v.
RUSSELL: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT
Police encouragement of a crime, or the affirmative trap as it has been
called,' is used to detect such crimes as prostitution, gambling and nar-
cotic sales-those "vice crimes" that are prohibited by laws protecting
the general health and welfare of the public. Since these crimes are
committed in private with a willing "victim" they defy detection by con-
ventional police methods. Private or "victimless" crimes that have been
the focus of this practice have involved intoxicating liquors, 2 explosive
sales, 3 larceny, 4 practicing medicine or dentistry without a license, 5 nar-
cotic sales,6 unethical practice of law, 7 and other crimes such as bribery,
burglary, gambling, perjury, receiving stolen goods, arson, extortion and
conspiracy.8
Detection of these secret criminal acts and apprehension of the vio-
lators necessitates that the police be present at the time and place the
crime is committed. After the police or their agents have a reasonable
suspicion that a person is currently, or about to become, engaged in the
1. Comment, Administration of the Affirmative Trap and the Doctrine of En-
trapment: Device and Defense, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 137 (1963).
2. People v. Steig, 258 Ill. App. 447 (1930); People v. Schell, 240 IlI. App. 254
(1926); Evanston v. Myers, 172 Ill. 266, 50 N.E. 204 (1898). See also 55 A.L.R.
2d 1322.
3. People v. Ficke, 343 Ill. 367, 175 N.E. 543 (1931).
4. People v. Smith, 251 Ill. 185, 95 N.E. 1041 (1911).
5. People v. Boyden, 400 Ill. 409, 81 N.E.2d 142 (1948); People v. Mattei,
381 Ill. 21, 44 N.E.2d 576 (1942); People v. Paderewski, 373 111. 197, 25 N.E.2d 784
(1940); People v. Beach, 266 II1. App. 272 (1932).
6. People v. Clay, 32 I11. 2d 608, 210 N.E.2d 221 (1965); People v. Hall,
25 Ill. 2d 297, 185 N.E.2d 143, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 849 (1962); People v. Clark,
7 III. 2d 163, 130 N.E.2d 195 (1955); People v. Guagliata, 362 Il. 427, 200 N.E. 169
(1936); Chicago v. Brendecke, 170 Ill. App. 25 (1912). See also 33 A.L.R.2d 883.
7. In re Horwitz, 360 Ill. 313, 196 N.E. 208 (1935).
8. Cases on areas covered are collected in Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 677 (1951);
Annot., 66 A.L.R. 478 (1930), supplementing 18 A.L.R. 146 (1922); Comment,
The Doctrine of Entrapment and Its Application in Texas, Sw. L.J. 456, 463 (1965);
Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons and Agent Provoca-
teurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951).
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commission of a crime, they will "encourage"9 the suspect's commission
of the crime by acting as a willing participant. Narcotics law enforce-
ment is one major area in which police encouragement is used since the
affirmative trap is the only effective means of penetration. The nature
of the crime-its secrecy and clandestine methods of operation-makes it
impossible for a policeman or narcotics agent to infiltrate a drug ring or
make a street purchase without using an informer or undercover agent. 10
From the police practice of encouragement and the affirmative trap
many problems arise." The major controversy surrounds entrapment-
where police encouragement sometimes goes to the extent of inducing
an otherwise innocent person to commit a crime. The limits to which
the courts are willing to go in acknowledging the defense of entrapment
are exemplified in United States v. Russell12 and People v. Dollen.18  In
Russell, the United States Supreme Court was presented with an oppor-
tunity to reconsider the federal test of entrapment, 14 which has seen a
gradual expansion in interpretation through several lower federal court
decisions. 15 The Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Dollen, dealt with
another aspect of entrapment-the necessity of establishing that an en-
trapper is a public officer or employee or agent of either. In Dollen the
court held for the first time that the supplying of narcotics by an inform-
ant could be established by inference from the surrounding circumstances.
The purposes of this note are to trace the development of the en-
trapment defense in federal and Illinois law, and to distinguish the ele-
ments recognized in each judicial system.
ENTRAPMENT IN FEDERAL LAW
The defense of entrapment was not recognized at early common law;' 6
9. Encouragement is really a process of persuasion. See Rotenberg, The Police
Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 VA. L. REV. 871, 875 (1963).
10. Approximately 90% of narcotic sales detections involve the use of an in-
former in the selection and encouragement of a suspect. Rotenberg, supra note 9,
at 875 n.15.
11. For example, it has been estimated that the average "controlled buy" re-
quires anywhere from fifty to seventy-five hours to engineer. See Comment, Ad-
ministration of the Affirmative Trap and the Doctrine of Entrapment; Device and
Defense, supra note 1.
12. 41 U.S. 423 (1973).
13. 53 Ill. 2d 280, 290 N.E.2d 879 (1972).
14. There is presently no federal statutory provision for the defense of entrap-
ment. The federal test is derived from the holdings of Sorrels v. United States and
Sherman v. United States. See note 22 infra. A bill is now before the United
States Congress which would give the defense an expressed formulation. S.1, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 1-302 (1973).
15. See notes 40, 41 and 43 and accompanying text infra.
16. Board of Commissioners v. Bakus, 29 How. Pr. 33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1864).
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it is a development of twentieth century law.17 The possibility of en-
trapment was mentioned in Grimm v. United States,'8 but Woo Wai v.
United States,19 was the first federal court case to recognize and sustain
a defense claim of entrapment. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Casey v.
United States,20 considered the defense but it was not until Sorrells v.
United States" that the Supreme Court considered in depth the doctrine
of entrapment as a affirmative defense in criminal prosecution. In Sor-
rells, the Court said:
[Entrapment occurs] when the criminal design originates with the offi-
cials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent
person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its com-
mission in order that they may prosecute. 2 2
The members of the Court disagreed on the rationale of the doctrine
of entrapment. The majority based its decision on the premise that Con-
gress, in enacting the National Prohibition Act, did not intend it to apply
17. For the general historical development and analysis see Rotenberg, supra
note 9, at 890; Note, Contingent Fee For Informer Not Entrapment Where Justifi-
cation Exists, 16 SRAcusE L. REv. 143, 144 (1964); The Doctrine of Entrapment
and its Application in Texas; supra note 8, at 456; Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrap-
ment in Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. Rv. 245 (1942); Comment, Due Process of
Law and the Entrapment Defense, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 821, 822 (1964); Donnelly,
supra note 8, at 1098; Note, Entrapment by Government Officials, 28 COLtJM. L.
RaV. 1067 (1928).
18. 156 U.S. 604 (1895). A post-office inspector who "suspected defendant
was engaged in the business of dealing in obscene pictures" wrote and received from
the defendant packages of obscene pictures under an assumed name. The Court
stated: "It does not appear that it was the purpose of the post office inspector to
induce or solicit the commission of a crime, but it was to ascertain whether the de-
fendant was engaged in an unlawful business." Id. at 610.
19. 223 Fed. 412 (6th Cir. 1916).
20. 276 U.S. 413 (1928). Justice Brandeis stated:
The obstacle to the prosecution lies in the fact that the alleged crime was
instigated by officers of the Government; that the act for which the Gov-
ernment seeks to punish the defendant is the fruit of their criminal conspir-
acy to induce its commission. The Government may set decoys to entrap
criminals. But it may not provoke or create a crime and then punish the
criminal, its creature.
Id. at 423. He went on to say: "Ihis prosecution should be stopped, not because
some right of Casey's has been denied, but in order to protect the Government.
To protect it from illegal conduct of its officers. To preserve the purity of its
courts." Id. at 425.
21. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). Martin, a federal prohibition agent posing as a
tourist visited with the defendant. During their conversation it was discovered
they were both war veterans of the same division. While discussing their common
war experiences Martin asked defendant twice for liquor but was refused., After the
third request the defendant agreed; he was prosecuted for violation of the National
Prohibition Act.
22. 287 U.S. at 442.
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to those situations where an otherwise innocent person was lured into
the commission of a crime.2" Thus the Court took the position that the
defense of entrapment was available only when the intent to commit a
crime originated with a government official.
The minority felt the defense should be a tool of judicial procedure
rather than of statutory construction. Rather than focusing on congres-
sional intent derived from the language of the statute, the Court re-
garded the doctrine of entrapment as a "fundamental rule of public pol-
icy."' 24 The minority also focused on reprehensible methods25 of police
conduct rather than congressional intent in defining entrapment. 26 Mr.
Justice Roberts, in a separate opinion, defined entrapment as
the conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his procure-
ment of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except
for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer.27
Twenty-five years after Sorrells the Supreme Court again dealt with
23. The Court held: "We are unable to conclude that it was the intention of
Congress in enacting this statute that its processes of detection and enforcement
should be abused by the instigation of government officials of an act on the part of
persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to punish
them." 287 U.S. at 448.
24. 287 U.S. at 457. Justice Roberts stated: "The doctrine rests, rather, on a
fundamental rule of public policy. The protection of its own functions and the
preservation of the purity of its own temple belongs only to the court." See also
Strader v. United States, 72 F.2d 589, 591 (10th Cir. 1934); Billingsley v. United
States, 274 F. 86 (6th Cir. 1921); Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412, 415
(9th Cir. 1915); United States v. Echols, 253 F. 862 (S.D. Tex. 1918); People v.
Crawford, 105 Cal. App. 2d 530, 536, 234 P.2d 181, 185 (1951); In re Horwitz,
360 Ill. 313, 196 N.E. 208 (1935); Rotenberg, supra note 9, at 897.
25. 287 U.S. at 453. See also 356 U.S. at 380; People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434,
447, 282 P.2d 905, 913 (1955); MODEL PENAL CODE, Art. 2, para. 2.13, Comment
(Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
26. Many theories have been offered over the years to explain the basis of en-
trapment. Besides those mentioned in Sorrells-congressional intent, purity of the
courts and preventative measures to police conduct--other theories are: (1) estoppel
-the government cannot be permitted to prosecute an individual for a crime where
it is the instigator of his conduct and the criminal act is not the direct result of
the accused's intentions (United States v. Kaiser, 138 F.2d 219 (7th Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 801 (1945); United States v. Cerone, 150 F.2d 382, cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 756 (1945); United States v. Healy, 202 F. 349, 350 (D.C. Mont.
1913); State v. Marquardt, 139 Conn. 1, 89 A.2d 9 (1952) ); (2) the right to be free
from temptation (Note, Defense of Entrapment: A Plea for Constitutional Stand-
ards, 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 63, 65 (1967) ); (3) constitutional validity (see notes 50
to 53 and accompanying text infra, and (4) self-incrimination. See generally,
Rotenberg, supra note 9, at 620-24; Comment, "The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did
Eat-The Constitutional Status of the Entrapment Defense, 74 YALE LJ. 942, 949-52
(1965); Note, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 63 supra, at 72-73; Comment, 1964 U. ILL. L.F.
821, 822 (1964), supra note 17, at 824-25).
27. 287 U.S. at 454.
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the defense of entrapment in Sherman v. United States.28 In Sherman
the Court was divided on the same issue. The majority again defined
the defense on the basis of the origin of intent while the minority relied
on police conduct. The majority in framing the issue as "whether the
informer had convinced an otherwise unwilling person to commit a crim-
inal act or whether petitioner was already predisposed to commit the
act ... 29 reflected their belief that Congress had not intended the stat-
ute to apply to cases in which the conduct was instigated by the police.80
The Court held: "Entrapment occurs only when the criminal conduct
was 'the product of the creative activity' of law enforcement officials."'' a
Merely affording an opportunity for the commission of the crime did not
constitute entrapment.3 2 The majority in both Sorrells and Sherman fo-
cused on the origin of criminal intent-if the criminal design originated
with the police officer and was implanted in the mind of a person other-
wise innocent, there was entrapment . 3
The minority in Sherman followed the concurring minority opinion of
Sorrells. Entrapment is a valid defense whenever police conduct in a
particular situation falls below a certain objective standard.3 4  The mi-
nority looks to police conduct rather than origin of intent. Thus the shift
is from the conduct of the defendant to the conduct of the police.
United States v. Russell3 5 is the latest United States Supreme Court
28. 356 U.S. 369 (1958). Kalchinan, a government informer, met defendant at
a doctor's office where both were being treated to be cured of narcotics addiction.
After several discussions, Kalchinan asked defendant about a source of narcotics
indicating that he was suffering and the cure was not working. Defendant tried to
avoid the issue, but after repeated requests on several occasions he secured a supply
which he shared with Kalchinan.
29. 356 U.S. at 371.
30. Id. at 372; Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 450.
31. 356 U.S. at 372 citing Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441, 451.
32. The Court held that since Kalchinan used sympathy and repeated requests to
achieve his ends this was entrapment and not merely affording the defendant an
opportunity to commit a crime.
33. Innocent in this context is the absence of a predisposition or a willingness
to readily respond to the opportunity afforded by the officer to commit a criminal
act, that is, the defendant would not have perpetrated the crime with which he is
presently charged but for the enticement of the police official.
34. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the concurring opinion stated: "The Courts re-
fuse to convict an entrapped defendant, not because his conduct falls outside the
proscription of the statute, but because, even if his guilt be admitted, the methods
employed on behalf of the Government to bring about conviction cannot be counte-
nanced." 356 U.S. at 380. The focus is not the predisposition of the defendant but
rather "whether the police conduct revealed in the particular case falls below the
standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental
power." Id. at 382.
35. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
decision to affirm the entrapment test formulated in the Sorrells and
Sherman decisions. In this case, Joe Shapiro, undercover agent for the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, met with Russell and
the latter's codefendants. Shapiro stated that he represented an organi-
zation desirous of controlling the manufacture and distribution of meth-
amphetamine ("speed") in the Pacific Northwest. An agreement was
reached whereby the agent was to supply the defendant with phenyl-2-
propanone, an essential chemical ingredient, in return for one-half of
the drug produced. During this meeting, Russell's codefendant Patrick
Connolly told the agent that since May, 1969, they had produced three
pounds of the drug.36 Connolly also gave the agent a bag of metham-
phetamine claiming it to be part of a quantity produced earlier.
On December 10, 1969, the manufacturing process was completed
and the agent was given his half. He also purchased an additional
amount. A month later Shapiro contacted Connolly and asked him if he
was still interested in their arrangement. Connolly said he was and
would have another batch of methamphetamine ready in a couple of
days because he had obtained an additional two bottles of phenyl-2-pro-
pane. Shapiro returned later with a search warrant and seized the con-
traband including a bottle of propane which he had not supplied. Russell
was convicted of having unlawfully manufactured, processed, sold and
delivered methamphetamine.
The appellate court reversed the conviction37 on the ground that even
if the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime there was an in-
tolerable degree of governmental participation in the criminal transac-
tion.38  The court held an entrapment defense could be established on
one of two alternate theories: (1) an entrapment rationale--entrapment
exists as a matter of law regardless of the accused's predisposition to com-
mit the crime whenever the government supplies the contraband to the
accused; or (2) a non-entrapment rationale-when the government be-
comes so enmeshed in criminal activity as to be repugnant to American
36. At trial Connolly admitted making the statement but said it was false.
Id. at 425 n.2.
37. United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972).
38. The court said: "[R]egardless of the significance of 'predisposition' as an
element in entrapment,' we conclude that there is merit in Russell's contention that
a defense to a criminal charge may be founded upon an intolerable degree of govern-
mental participation in the criminal enterprise." United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d
671, 673 (9th Cir. 1972). See also the concurring opinions of Justices Frank-
furter and Roberts in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378-85 (1958) and
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453-59 (1932) notes 24 to 34 and accom-
panying text supra.
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criminal justice a conviction will be barred.39
The first theory is derived principally from the decisions of United
States v. Bueno40 and United States v. Chisum.41 The appellate court
reasoned that the agent, by supplying the essential ingredient of the drug
to Russell, was supplying contraband-a practice the courts in Bueno and
Chisum held to be entrapment as a matter of law.42 The second theory
was deduced from Greene v. United States.43 The court acknowledged the
unique circumstances involved in Greene but said. the Russell case, if
not so unique, was "equally repugnant, if not more so, than the conduct
of the Agent in Greene."' 44  The court concluded that under either ra-
tionale reversal was required. It said:
Apparently, the only difference between Bueno and Chisum, as distin-
guished from Greene, is the label affixed to the result. Both theories are
premised on fundamental concepts of due process and evince the reluc-
tance of the judiciary to contenance "overzealous law enforcement." We
do not choose to affix a label to our result; hence, we need not select
between the alternate theories. Here, both compel the same disposition. 45
39. 459 F.2d at 673-74.
40. 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971). The court held the defendant could not be
convicted of possession and sale of heroin where there was no rebuttal of defend-
ant's testimony that a government informer purchased heroin in Mexico, imported it
to the United States and induced him to make a sale to a government agent.
41. 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970). Defendant told a reputed counter-
feiter that he wished to purchase counterfeit money. A government agent was in-
formed of this scheme and supplied the defendant with the counterfeit money and
then arrested him for receiving counterfeit money with intent to pass the same as
genuine. The court held there was entrapment as a matter of law though the
intent to commit the crime originated solely with the defendant without government
inducement.
42. It should be noted that two different conclusions were reached concerning
the same factual situation in Russell. The majority opinion of the appellate court
stated that the drug could not have been manufactured but for the government
supply of the essential ingredient: "Russell would have been powerless to 'commit'
the charged offenses without the Government's pervasive intervention." 459 F.2d at
673. The sole dissenting opinion at the appellate level and the Supreme Court,
on the other hand, said that this drug could have been manufactured without the
agent's intervention. This different interpretation of the factual situation was one
factor that lead the Supreme Court to reverse the appellate court. See 459 F.2d at
675 (Trask, J., dissenting).
43. 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971). A government agent contacted defendants
and urged and aided them in the production of bootleg whiskey by supplying equip-
ment, an operator for the still, sugar and acting as its only customer. The court held
that although this was not an entrapment case the government's involvement in the
creation and maintenance of this bootlegging operation so enmeshed itself in the
criminal activity that it barred prosecution.
44. 459 F.2d 674 (1972).
45. id. at 674 (footnotes omitted).
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The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appel-
late court.46 Again, as in Sorrells and Sherman, the Court was divided on
the rationale of the entrapment defense. 47 The Court reconsidered the
theory behind the entrapment defense set forth in Sorrells and Sherman48
as it dealt with the two principle contentions of the defendant: first, the
constitutional validity of entrapment; and second, the rationale followed
by the appellate court--entrapment as a matter of law, without regard to
the accused's predisposition, if there is "an intolerable degree of govern-
mental participation in the criminal enterprise. '49
It has been suggested that due process forbids the conviction of any
person for a solicited offense unless he had been engaged in criminal
conduct or had a criminal design because this, in effect, is a denial of
liberty without due process. 50 One court has held that a conviction pro-
cured by entrapment is in violation of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. 51 Fundamental fairness and decency invoked under the
due process clause 52 would appear applicable to entrapment. However,
most courts reject the contention that freedom from entrapment is a right
protected under the fourteenth amendment due process clause. 53
Russell contended that the agent's involvement in the manufacturing
of the drug was so great that prosecution violated the fundamental prin-
ciples of due process. 54  This argument, analogized to the exclusionary
46. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
47. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, and Powell joined. Justice Douglas filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Justice Brennan joined. Justice Stewart filed a dissent-
ing opinion, in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined.
48. 411 U.S. at 428-30.
49. 459 F.2d at 673.
50. See Comment, "The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat"--The Constitu.
tional Status of the Entrapment Defense, 74 YALE L.J. 942 (1965); Rotenberg, supra
note 9; Note, Defense of Entrapment: A Plea for Constitutional Standards, 20 U.
FLA. L. REv. 63 (1967).
51. Cf. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 467 (1958).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970)
where the court stated:
Entrapment is indistinguishable from other law enforcement practices
which the courts have held to violate due process. Entrapment is an af-
front to the basic concepts of justice. Where it exists, law enforcement
techniques become contrary to the established law of the land as an im-
pairment to due process.
Id. at 1312; Banks v. United States, 249 F.2d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 1957) ("A con-
viction so procured is in violation of the due process provision of the Fifth Amend-
ment. . .")
53. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hall v. Illinois, 329 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1964).
54. 411 U.S. at 430.
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rule of illegal searches and seizures55 and confessions, 6 was rejected by
the Court:
Unlike the situations giving rise to the holdings in Mapp and Miranda,
the Government's conduct here violated no independent constitutional
rights of the respondent. Nor did Shapiro [agent] violate any federal
statute or rule or commit any crime infiltrating the respondent's drug en-
terprise.57
The Court later said:
The law enforcement conduct here stops far short of violating that "funda-
mental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice," mandated
by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 58
The Court, however, did not rule out the possibility that it may eventually
face a situation where the entrapment defense based on due process would
be a valid defense. 59
The Court also declined to accept Russell's second contention that en-
trapment is a valid defense even if the government supplied the contra-
band. 60  The Court, referring to the decisions of Bueno, Chisum and
Greene stated:
Several decisions of the United States district courts and courts of appeals
have undoubtedly gone beyond this Court's opinions in Sorrells and Sher-
man in order to bar prosecutions because of what they thought to be. for
want of a better term, "overzealous law enforcement." But the defense
55. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914). Other attempts to analogize this defense to illegal searches and seizures
emphasize probable cause-since searches and seizures require probable cause, the
police should have reasonable grounds for suspecting such criminal conduct or design
before they engage in solicitation or encouragement. Also analogous to search and
seizure cases is the preventative function behind it-the purpose is to curtail rep-
rehensible police activity. The exclusionary rule under search and seizure and the
valid defense under entrapment are both means to attain this function.
56. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
57. 411 U.S. at 430.
58. Id. at 432, citing Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234,
246 (1960).
59. Id. The Court stated: "While we may some day be presented with a situa-
tion in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due proc-
ess principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes
to obtain a conviction, . . . the instant case is distinctly not of that breed."
(citation omitted). Id. at 431-32.
60. This essentially was the position taken by the appellate court citing the de-
cisions of Bueno, Chisum and Greene. See notes 40, 41 and 43 supra. The Bueno
and Chisum decisions cited with approval the Illinois decision of People v. Strong,
21 Ill. 2d 320, 172 N.E.2d 765 (1961), which held that entrapment exists as a
matter of law where the government supplies the narcotics. Thus it appears the
Supreme Court in Russell has not, at least indirectly, sanctioned (as having gone
beyond the Sorrells and Sherman rationale adopted by the Illinois statute, note 71
infra) the Illinois decision of Strong. See note 88 infra.
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of entrapment enunciated in those opinions was not intended to give the
federal judiciary a "chancellor's foot" veto over law enforcement prac-
tices of which it did not approve.
We think that the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case quite
unnecessarily introduces an unmanageably subjective standard which is
contrary to the holdings of this Court in Sorrells and Sherman. 6'
The Court took the position that these lower federal court decisions so
expanded the narrowly defined entrapment defense they were, in effect,
giving the judicial branch of government authority it did not possess. 2
As in Sorrells and Sherman the Court refused to base the defense on the
type and degree of government conduct. Since Russell was involved in
the manufacturing of illicit drugs before and after the government agent
supplied the necessary ingredient, his predisposition was fatal to his claim
of entrapment.63
Two dissenting opinions were given. The first, a brief opinion, au-
thored by Justice Douglas, cited the concurring opinions of Sorrells and
Sherman as well as the decisions of Greene, Bueno and Chisum to sup-
port the view that a conviction could not be sanctioned in Russell due
to the extent of government participation in the manufacturing of the
drug. Justice Douglas stated:
[T]he fact that the chemical ingredient supplied by the federal agent might
have been obtained from other sources is quite irrelevant. Supplying the
chemical ingredient used in the manufacture of this batch of "speed"
made the United States an active participant in the unlawful activity. 64
61. 411 U.S. at 435.
62. The Court said:
[Sorrels and Sherman] establish that entrapment is a relatively limited
defense. It is rooted not in any authority of the Judicial Branch to dismiss
prosecutions for what it feels to have been "overzealous law enforcement"
but instead in the notion that Congress could not have intended criminal
punishment for a defendant who has committed all the elements of a pre-
scribed offense but who was induced to commit them by the government.
Id. at 435.
63. The Court reasoned that since the record disclosed that the propane ingredi-
ent was obtainable elsewhere and since the defendants had admitted making other
batches without the ingredient supplied by the agent, the agent was merely "af-
fording an opportunity" rather than inducing the defendants to commit a criminal
act.
64. 411 U.S. at 437. Justice Douglas went on to say:
Federal agents play a debased role when they become the instigators of the
crime, or partners in its commission, or the creative brain behind the illegal
scheme. That is what the federal agent did here when he furnished the
accused with one of the chemical ingredients needed to manufacture the
unlawful drug.
Id. at 439.
1973]
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Mr. Justice Stewart wrote the second dissenting opinion. He reviewed
the "subjective" and "objective" dichotomy that has plagued the courts
since Sorrells and Sherman and concluded:
In my view, this objective approach to entrapment advanced by [the con-
curring opinions in Sorrells and Sherman] is the only one truly consistent
with the underlying rationale of the defense. Indeed, the very basis of
the entrapment defense itself demands adherence to an approach that fo-
cuses on the conduct of the governmental agents, rather than on whether
the defendant was "predisposed" or "otherwise innocent." 65
Thus "predisposition" and "otherwise innocent" become irrelevant if one
views the defense as a means of prohibiting unlawful governmental ac-
tivity rather than protecting those "otherwise innocent." 66
Justice Stewart rejected the test that makes entrapment dependent on
the predisposition of the defendant. First, the purpose of the defense was
not to protect persons otherwise innocent but rather to prohibit unlawful
government activity. 67 Second, such a test had prejudicial possibilites. 6
He offered a test similar to the concurring opinions in Sorrells and Sher-
man:
[Wihen the agents' involvement in criminal activities goes beyond the mere
offering of such an opportunity and when their conduct is of a kind that
could induce or instigate the commission of a crime by one not ready
and willing to commit it, then-regardless of the character or propensities
of the particular person induced-I think entrapment has occured.69
65. Id. at 441 (footnotes omitted).
66. "Otherwise innocent" is misleading because since one has committed an
unlawful act he cannot be innocent of it; one may be "predisposed" even if he did
not originate the intent in the sense he has shown his capability of committing a
crime. Id. at 442.
67. Id. Justice Stewart reasoned that since the defense applies only if the
temptor is a government agent and not a private person, the focus must be on the
conduct of agents and not the predisposition of the defendant.
68. Pointing out the use of hearsay, suspicion, rumor, evidence of defendant's
bad reputation or past criminal activities to prove predisposition is often unreliable
and highly prejudicial:
[F]or, despite instructions to the contrary, the jury may well consider such
evidence as probative not simply of the defendant's predisposition, but of
his guilt of the offense with which he stands charged ...
Stated another way, this subjective test means that the Government is
permitted to entrap a person with a criminal record or bad reputation, and
then to prosecute him for the manufactured crime, confident that his rec-
ord or reputation itself will be enough to show that he was predisposed to
commit the offense anyway.
See also Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382:
"[There may] be substantial risk that, in spite of instructions, the jury will allow a
criminal record or bad reputation to weigh in its determination of guilt of the specific
offense for which he stands charged."
69. Id. at 445.
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After analyzing the theoretical basis of entrapment, Justice Stewart ap-
plied his reasoning to the facts presented. Disregarding the defendant's
predisposition, the questions became one of determining whether or not
the government agent had exceeded permissible government conduct. He
felt that the supplying of the necessary ingredient in order to prosecute
Russell for the manufacturing of an illicit drug was the type of govern-
ment conduct that the entrapment defense was meant to prevent.
The court of appeals concluded that the drug could not have been
manufactured were it not for the agents supplying the necessary ingre-
dient. The majority of the Supreme Court rejected this as contrary to the
finding of facts that Russell and his codefendants were able to produce
the drug before and after receiving the agent's supply-thus the Court con-
cluded the agent merely afforded an opportunity to commit the offense.
The dissent rejected this argument because the defendant was prosecuted
for the particular batch for which the government agent had supplied the
necessary ingredient.70
Thus the Supreme Court in Russell failed to mend the dichotomy that
developed in Sorrells and Sherman.
ENTRAPMENT IN ILLINOIS LAW
The origin of intent test formulated in Sorrells and Sherman and con-
firmed in Russell provides the basis for both the statutory formulation
71
and judicial decisions72 in Illinois. If the criminal intent originates with
the state official or his agent who seeks to entrap the accused in order
to arrest and prosecute him, the defense of entrapment will bar convic-
tion. 73  However, there is no entrapment if a public officer or employee
70. Id. at 449:
The Government ... prosecuted that person for making the drug produced
with the very ingredient which its agent had so helpfully supplied. This
strikes me as the very pattern of conduct that should be held to constitute
entrapment as a matter of law [footnote omitted].
71. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 7-12 (1971):
A person is not guilty of an offense if his conduct is incited or induced by a
public officer or employee, or agent of either, for the purpose of obtaining
evidence for the prosecution of such person. However, this Section is inap-
plicable if a public officer or employee, or agent of either merely affords to
such person the opportunity or facility for committing an offense in fur-
therance of a criminal purpose which such person has originated.
72. See, e.g., People v. Hall, 25 Ill. 2d 297, 185 N.E.2d 143 (1962), cert. denied,
374 U.S. 849 (1962); People v. Outten, 13 Ill. 2d 21, 147 N.E.2d 284 (1958);
People v. Clark, 7 Ill. 2d 163, 130 N.E.2d 195 (1955); People v. Guagliata, 362
Ill. 427, 200 N.E. 169 (1936); In re Horwitz, 360 Ill. 313, 196 N.E. 208 (1935).
73. People v. Wells, 25 Ill. 2d 146, 182 N.E.2d 689 (1962); People v. McSmith,
23 Ill. 2d 87, 178 N.E.2d 641 (1961); People v. Lewis, 80 IM. App. 2d 101, 224 N.E.
2d 647 (1967).
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or agent of either merely affords the opportunity or facility for commit-
ting an offense in furtherance of a criminal purpose which an accused has
originated. 74
In Illinois, certain elements must be present before the statutory de-
fense of entrapment can be claimed by the defendant. The first part of
the statute reads:
A person is not guilty of an offense if his conduct is incited or induced
by a public officer or employee, or agent of either, for the purpose of
obtaining evidence for the prosecution of such person. 75
How is conduct "incited or induced?" Prohibited police conduct may
include inducement, solicitation, coercion, deception, trickery, fraud or
appeals to friendship or sympathy. To establish entrapment it must ap-
pear that the accused had no intention or predisposition of committing
a crime.
Police action cannot be passive-police must actively encourage the sus-
pect to commit the offense. Merely affording an opportunity to commit a
crime is not sufficient to establish incitement or inducement.7 13 Thus, an
essential element for entrapment is that the accused is by inducement, or
excessive persuasion, lured into the commission of a crime he had not
contemplated.
A second element of entrapment is that the entrapper must be a "pub-
lic officer or employee, or agent of either."' 77  There are no Illinois
cases holding purely private action sufficient to provide an entrapment
defense-when the encouragement or an affirmative trap comes from a
private individual rather than an official or his agent, the state is no longer
74. People v. Clay, 32 Ill. 2d 608, 210 N.E.2d 221 (1965); People v. Anthony,
28 Ill. 2d 65, 190 N.E.2d 837 (1963); People v. Morgan, 98 I1l. App. 2d 435,
240 N.E.2d 286 (1968); People v. Johnson, 66 111. App. 2d 465, 214 N.E.2d 354
(1966).
75. See note 71 supra.
76. See People v. Wright, 27 Ill. 2d 557, 190 N.E.2d 318 (1963); People v.
Strong, 21 111. 2d 320, 172 N.E.2d 765 (1961) ("trickery, persuasion or fraud" of
the entrapper); People v. Gonzales, 125 Ill. App. 2d 225, 260 N.E.2d 234 (1970)
("incite, induce, instigate or lure" accused into committing an offense); People v.
Beach, 266 I11. App. 272 (1932) (offense charged was procured through "solicita-
tions and false representations"). But see People v. Luna, 69 I11. App. 2d 291,
216 N.E.2d 473, rev'd on other grounds, 37 Ill. 2d 299, 226 N.E.2d 586
(1966) (friendship with an informer does not raise question of entrapment);
People v. Lewis, 26 111. 2d 542, 187 N.E.2d 700 (1963); People v. Hall, 25 Ill. 2d
297, 185 N.E.2d 143, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 849 (1962) (appeal to sympathy not
sufficient to establish defense of entrapment); People v. Hatch, 49 Ill. App. 2d 177,
199 N.E.2d 81 (1964) (appeals to sympathy and friendship are not sufficient to
establish defense of entrapment).
77. See note 71 supra.
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the cause of the offense. Without this element, the basis of the defense,
to censure improper governmental conception of a criminal offense and
implanting the idea in an otherwise innocent person, is no longer pres-
ent.78 However, persons not governmental officials who act with official
sanction should be treated as governmental agents for purposes of en-
trapment.79 If the state profits from the affirmative trap, it should also
be accountable for its detriments.
People v. Dollens0 is the latest Illinois Supreme Court decision dealing
specifically with this element. In Dollen, the defendant, on January 28,
1969, during a routine inspection of taxicabs at the garage he man-
aged, found a small box containing morphine in the back seat of a cab
driven by informer Donald Wright. Wright, who was present along with
another driver, Elmer Davis, asked to see the box and immediately said
he could find a buyer for it. Defendant refused and said the box con-
tained someone's medicine and that it would be claimed.
Wright made repeated requests to sell the box but defendant refused.
On February 4th, the defendant finally assented to Wright's request after
he approached the defendant in an emotional state and told him he was
in trouble and the defendant could help him by selling the narcotics.
On the following day, February 5th, an Illinois narcotics agent and
informer Wright went to the taxicab garage. The defendant sold the box
to the narcotics agent for seventy-five dollars. After the sale the agent
on three different occasions sought to buy more drugs but each time the
defendant refused, the last time telling the agent he had found the box
under the back seat of a cab. The defendant was arrested on February
19th.
Testimony revealed that on February 6th, informer Wright was fired
by the defendant. Richard Pass, another employee, testified that on the
same day Wright said he had "fixed" the defendant. The president of the
cab company testified that also on February 6th, Wright told her she had
better look for a new manager because the defendant would soon be ar-
rested for selling narcotics to a state agent.
78. But see Mr. Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Russell, 411 U.S. at 442:
"That he was induced, provoked, or tempted to do so by government agents does not
make him any more innocent or any less predisposed than he would be if he had
been induced, provoked, or tempted by a private person-which, of course, would not
entitle him to cry 'entrapment.'"
79. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 373-75 (1958). Cf., 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970) which
provides criminal sanctions against anyone acting "under color of any law" who de-
prives another of his civil rights. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945);
United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951).
80. 53 Ill. 2d 280, 290 N.E.2d 879 (1972).
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Elmer Davis, another driver, testified that a few days after the sale,
Wright, in his presence, told the defendant that he had received money
from the state and he could end this matter if the defendant would rehire
him. Both Davis and Pass testified as to the animosity that had existed
between the defendant and Wright because of the latter's treatment of
customers.
Informer Wright was not available at the time of trial. The defendant
was tried and convicted for the unlawful sale of a narcotic drug. The ap-
pellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments hold-
ing the evidence presented created an inference that Wright acting inde-
pendently may have depositied the box so that the defendant might find
the drugs and be encouraged to sell them to a narcotics agent. There
was a possibility of entrapment, and the failure of the state to produce
Wright at the trial or otherwise present evidence to refute defense testi-
mony and establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not
entrapped warranted reversal.
Defendant argued the defense of entrapment as set forth in People v.
Strong"l and People v. Jones.s2 In both of these cases, unrefuted testi-
mony of the defendant disclosed that the narcotics which the accused was
alleged to have sold were supplied by an informer. This, and the unex-
plained failure to produce the informer as a witness to controvert the de-
fendant's testimony, s8 gave rise to an inference of entrapment which war-
ranted reversal of the narcotic conviction.
The appellate court distinguished Strong and Jones from Dollen. In
Strong and Jones the defendant testified that the state supplied the nar-
cotics; from this and the failure of the state to call its informer the court
then inferred the truth af such testimony. However, the appellate court
pointed out:
In the case at hand defendant's unrebutted testimony was not that the in-
former supplied the drugs, but that he found the box in the informer's
81. 21 Ill. 2d 320, 172 N.E.2d 765 (1961).
82. 73 Ill. App. 2d 55, 219 N.E.2d 12 (1966).
83. In Dollen informer Wright, upon request, was given fifty dollars by the
narcotics agent so that he could leave town. Appellant argued that such supplying of
funds to leave the area was prejudical and a denial of constituional rights. See
Brief for Appellant at 17 and Brief for Appellee at 15, People v. Dollen, 53 Ill. 2d
280, 290 N.E.2d 879 (1972). The appellate court held it was not prejudicial:
"[Diefendant made no motion to produce the witnesses and there was testimony
that Wright had in fact returned and been seen in the area during the period before
trial." People v. Dollen, 2 Ill. App. 3d 567, 573, 275 N.E.2d 446, 450 (1971).
See also People v. Williams, 38 Ill. 2d 150, 230 N.E.2d 214 (1967) and People v.
Wilson, 24 I11. 2d 425, 182 N.E.2d 683 (1962). The supreme court did not deal
with this contention.
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taxicab. Were we to apply the rule of Strong and Jones to these facts, we
would first have to infer that the informer placed the drugs in the cab.
Then in order to find entrapment, we would be required to use that in-
ference as a basis for a second inference regarding the truth of defendant's
testimony. We will not engage in speculating on the existence of entrap-
ment where the evidence merely "suggests" the informer supplied the
drugs.84
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, did go one step further. They
held for the first time that the supplying of narcotics by an informer or
agent could be established by inference from the totality of the sur-
rounding circumstances. The court stated:
We do not imply that any law enforcement official was involved in a plan
to place the narcotics in the vehicle, but we believe that the totality of the
evidence was sufficient to indicate that Wright, acting independently, may
have deposited the package so as to result in its detection by defendant,
thus establishing the possibility of entrapment.85
The court further said:
The State, for example, may have easily rebutted defense testimony con-
cerning the manner in which the drugs were found or the inference of
their possible source by calling the informer to testify. However, it chose
not to, explaining that Wright has disappeared .... 86
Based on the evidence presented, along with the principles that the
state is responsible for the conduct of its informers87 and a conviction for
84. 2 Ml1. App. 3d 567, 572, 275 N.E.2d 446, 449 (1971). See Brief for Appellee
at 11-12, People v. Dollen, 53 Il. 2d 280, 290 N.E.2d 879 (1972):
In the few cases where entrapment has been held to be a defense, the
distinction seems to rest on the fact that the drug itself was actually
furnished by the state and sold to the defendant by an informer so the
defendant could sell it back.
Here in our case nobody testified that the drug which was sold by
Dollen was supplied by the State.
85. 53 I11. 2d at 284, 290 N.E.2d at 882.
86. 53 Ill. 2d at 285, 290 N.E.2d at 882. See note 82 supra. The state con-
tended that it did not pay informer Wright to leave town to avoid process, but
rather when local police officials had tried to locate Wright it was discovered he had
"mysteriously disappeared." Brief for Appellee at 13, People v. Dollen, 53 IlM. 2d
280, 284, 290 N.E.2d 879, 882 (1972).
Illinois decisions have repeatedly held that the state is not under an obligation to
produce an informer as a witness. People v. Aldridge, 19 Ill. 2d 176, 180, 166
N.E.2d 563, 565 (1960). The state has a right to rely upon the argument of
credibility alone as an effective rebuttal to entrapment; this failure may give rise
to an inference against the state but it remains an issue of credibility for the jury.
People v. Strong, 21 Ill. 2d 320, 325, 172 N.E.2d 765, 768 (1961); People v. Gon-
zales, 125 Ill. App. 2d 225, 235, 260 N.E.2d 234, 239 (1970); People v. Jones, 73
Ill. App. 2d 55, 58, 219 N.E.2d 12, 13 (1966).
87. People v. Strong, 21 Ill. 2d 320, 326, 172 N.E.2d 765, 768 (1961).
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the unlawful sale of narcotics will not stand if the informer supplied the
drugs,88 the court concluded that "no evidence was presented to refute de-
fense testimony and establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant
was not entrapped into the commission of the offense charged. .. .
Thus, for the first time the Illinois Supreme Court held that the supply-
ing of drugs by an official could be established by inference. Although
the state is not required to produce an informer at trial, it must meet
its burden to rebut the testimony establishing entrapment and prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that a defendant was not entrapped.
The third element, following inducement by an official or employee
or agent of either, necessary to establish a valid defense of entrapment
focuses on the purpose: "obtaining evidence for the prosecution of such
[entrapped] person."' 0  Involved in this element are the grounds neces-
sary in order to obtain this evidence. Must there be probable cause, or is
mere suspicion sufficient in order to obtain evidence under police en-
couragement? Two terms that have been used are "substantial reason
to suspect," 9' and "reasonable grounds to believe."' 92 It appears the courts
feel that there must be "reasonable grounds to believe" that the accused
is engaged or intends to engage in unlawful activities. Thus reasonable
suspicion,98 rather than probable cause, 94 is sufficient for purposes of po-
88. In the Strong case the court said: "We know of no conviction for sale of
narcotics that has been sustained when the narcotics sold were supplied by an agent
of the government. This is more than mere inducement. In reality the government
is supplying the sine qua of the offense." People v. Strong, 21 Ill. 2d 320, 325,
172 N.E.2d 765, 768 (1961) cited with approval in People v. Jones, 73 Ill. App.
2d 55, 59, 219 N.E.2d 12, 13 (1966).
In Dollen, the Illinois Supreme Court also cited Russell and Bueno, People v.
Dollen, 53 Ill. 2d 280, 290 N.E.2d 879 (1972). The Russell decision relied in
part on Bueno and also United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal.
1970), both of which cited with approval the Strong case to support the con-
tention that entrapment exists as a matter of law, regardless of the accused's
predisposition to commit the crime for which he is charged, where the government
supplies the contraband. As seen, however, the United States Supreme Court has
since overruled United States v. Russell. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
89. 53 Ill. 2d at 285, 290 N.E.2d at 882 (1972). Defense evidence of entrap-
ment places the burden on the state to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt.
90. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
91. People v. Wells, 25 I11. 2d 146, 149, 182 N.E.2d 689, 691 (1962).
92. Ryles v. United States, 183 F.2d 944, 945 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 877 (1950); People v. Washington, 81 11. App. 2d 162, 225 N.E.2d 673, 675
(1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 991 (1968).
93. See Morales v. United States, 260 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1958) and People v.
Gonzales, 125 I11. App. 225, 260 N.E.2d 234 (1970) where the court held there was
no reasonable suspicion necessary for police encouragement.
94. Although the courts have held probable cause is not necessary, there must be
"reasonable grounds to believe." The problem is that the standard of "probable
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lice encouragement of a crime. The rationale and necessity behind this
requirement is the possibility that an innocent law abiding person may
succumb to a law enforcement official's persistent and attractive entice-
ment to commit a crime. What needs to be acknowledged is the fact
that the sole purpose of the affirmative trap is not to induce or allure
an innocent person to commit a crime, but to secure evidence for the
prosecution of a guilty person.95
The entrapment definition in Illinois reads:
However, this Section is inapplicable if a public officer or employee or
agent of either, merely affords to such person the opportunity or facility for
committing an offense in furtherance of a criminal purpose which such
person has originated.9 6
There is a clear distinction between affording an opportunity rather than
inducing or inciting a criminal act. There is no entrapment if the state
furnishes an opportunity for the commission of an offense in furtherance
of a criminal purpose which the accused has originated. 97 A person may
be tested, upon reasonable suspicion, by being offered an opportunity to
transgress the law. The opportunity afforded must relate to the ac-
cused who has originated the criminal intent, that is, if "the criminal design
originates with the officials of the government and they implant in the
mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense
and induce its commission in order that they may prosecute"98 then en-
trapment shall be a valid defense. °9 This element necessarily involves
cause" and "reasonable grounds to believe" are often used interchangeably. Both
really mean something less than evidence which is necessary for a conviction but is
more than mere suspicion. See BASSIOUNI, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROcESsES, 337-41
(1969). It is a question of probabilities which must take into consideration the
totality of the circumstances based on reasonableness. Somewhere between no
grounds for suspicion or mere suspicion and probable cause the courts have tried to
establish the grounds necessary to afford an opportunity to commit a crime.
95. People v. Lewis, 365 Ill. 156, 6 N.E.2d 175 (1936); People v. Ficke,
343 Ill. 367, 175 N.E. 543 (1931).
96. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
97. People v. Clay, 32 Ill. 2d 608, 210 N.E.2d 221 (1965); People v. Anthony,
28 Il. 2d 65, 190 N.E.2d 837 (1963); People v. Lewis, 26 111. 2d 542, 187 N.E.2d
700 (1963); People v. Van Scoyk, 20 Ill. 2d 232, 170 N.E.2d 151 (1960); People v.
Morgan, 98 I11. App. 2d 435, 240 N.E.2d 286 (1968). See, e.g., People v.
Brown, 95 Ill. App. 2d 66, 238 N.E.2d 102 (1968) where the court held that a
narcotics agent who went with informer and made purchase from defendant did
nothing more than provide defendant with an opportunity to commit a crime, thus
no entrapment.
98. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442.
99. People v. Hall, 25 Ill. 2d 297, 185 N.E.2d 143 (1962), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 849 (1963); People v. Wells, 25 I11. 2d 146, 182 N.E.2d 689 (1962) ("[I]f a
criminal design or intent to commit the offense originates in the mind of the one
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two inquiries. Did the accused originate the idea of committing this
particular offense and was he otherwise predisposed to commit the
crime? 100 Although the accused may not have originated the criminal
idea, he still will not be permitted to invoke the defense of entrapment
if he was otherwise predisposed because he is not an "innocent person"
induced or lured to commit an offense he would not otherwise commit.
It should be noted that the defense of entrapment is not available unless
the accused himself is responsible for each element necessary to establish
a criminal act. 10 ' If the government official or his agent performs any
of such essential elements of the crime, the defense shall be valid.10 2
This problem generally arises where criminality of the act is affected by
the question of consent. It has been held that entrapment must not be
under such circumstances as will amount to the consent of the person af
fected, since in such an instance one of the essential elements is missing.' 03
In narcotics cases the courts have not been confronted with this problem
because consent does not vitiate the offense.
In summary, then, certain elements should be present for the Illinois
defense of entrapment. First, the offense committed must have been in-
duced by the police or their agents, that is, the idea of committing the of-
fense must originate with the state and not with the accused. This in
volves three inquiries: Did the idea of committing the criminal act origi-
nate with the accused, and did the accused have any predisposition to
commit such an offense prior to the inducement? Second, the officer
must induce, incite, or actively encourage its commission and not merely
afford an opportunity. Third, the purpose must be for obtaining evi-
dence for prosecution.
who seeks to entrap the accused, and who lures him into its commission merely
for the purpose of arresting and prosecuting him, no conviction may be had." 25
Ill. 2d at 148, 182 N.E.2d at 691); People v. Gonzales, 125 Ill. App. 2d 225,
260 N.E.2d 234 (1970).
100. United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2nd Cir. 1952); Note, De-
fense of Entrapment, 28 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1180 (1953).
101. People v. Calcaterra, 33 Ill. 2d 541, 213 N.E.2d 270 (1965), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 7 (1966); People v. Lewis, 80 Ill. App. 2d 101, 224 N.E.2d 647 (1967).
102. Brown v. United States, 367 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1966) (per curiam) (con-
spiracy does not lie where co-conspirators are government agents); Love v. People,
160 Ill. 501, 43 N.E. 710 (1896) (the element of breaking-in missing in burglary
where entrapper opened the door to an office and the safe); State v. Neely, 90
Mont. 199, 300 P. 561 (1931); Finley v. State, 84 Okla. Crim. 309, 181 P.2d 849
(1947).
103. Guarro v. United States, 237 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1956); People v.
Jenkins, 210 Ill. App. 42 (1918); Stanley v. State, 25 Okla. Crim. 195, 212 P.
734 (1923).
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CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court continues to reject the "objective,"
police conduct, test of entrapment in favor of the "subjective," origin-of-
intent test. The Court, viewing the purpose of the entrapment defense
as a means of protecting an "otherwise innocent" person, has refused to
use the defense as a sanction against reprehensible police conduct. The
Illinois statute and judicial decisions have followed the subjective test;
however, Illinois has expanded the defense to encompass situations where
entrapment may exist as a matter of law, that is regardless of one's predis-
position, entrapment will exist if there is improper state conduct in the
encouragement of a crime such as supplying the narcotics the accused is
charged with possessing.
Unlike the United States Supreme Court decision in Russell, the Illinois
Supreme Court has cited with approval several lower federal court deci-
sions establishing entrapment as a matter of law.
The effect of the Russell decision on Illinois development remains to
be seen. Illinois' gradual evolution reflects a persistent question-must
there necessarily be an unavoidable dichotomy in the theory of entrap-
ment? The theories behind entrapment, apparently mutually exclusive,
should become inclusive-entrapment should be a defense to protect an
otherwise innocent person and act as a means of sanction against unlaw-
ful government activity in instigating crime.
Michael F. Dahlen
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